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In recent decades, mainly because of the rapid 
development of new technologies and metho-
dologies, neuroscientists have made many im-
portant discoveries about the human brain and 
cognition. These new methodologies have also led 
to an increasing interest in empirical and theo-
retical scientific research concerning the problem 
of human consciousness. Christof Koch’s 2012 
book is best considered in this context. For 
several years, Koch has been a leading researcher 
on the problem of consciousness from a 
neurobiological point of view. This book seems to 
be, in many respects, a result of his most recent 
reflections on the topic. 
The main purpose of the book is to present a 
«slim exposition on the modern science of 
consciousness», informing readers how the 
natural sciences address the question: «how do 
subjective feelings, how does consciousness, enter 
into the world?», or more particularly, what it is 
about the brain that makes one «conscious of 
colors, of pain and pleasure, of the past and of the 
future, of yourself and of others?» (p. ix). This 
issue and its consequences for a number of other 
problems in contemporary research on mind are 
addressed in the ten chapters of the book.  
The central question Koch’s analysis focuses 
on concerns the problem of the interaction 
between brain and consciousness, which is also 
related to the hard problem of consciousness, as it is 
known in contemporary philosophical literature. 
This can be understood, roughly, as the problem 
of explaining how and why conscious subjective 
experience arises from physical processes (see D. 
Chalmers, Facing up to the Problem of Con-
sciousness, in: «Journal of Consciousness Stu-
dies», vol. II, n. 3, 1995, pp. 200-219). Since 
science is still unable to account for this, many 
authors recognize an explanatory gap between the 
way in which we explain physical and conscious 
phenomena. Koch acknowledges the existence of 
both the hard problem (p. 3) and the explanatory 
gap (p. 1-2); however, he maintains that all 
subjective states (pain, joy, taste, etc.) actually 
originate from «agitations of nervous matter» 
(p. 1). For him, the brain – as «highly organized 
matter» – produces some «particular vibra-
tions» that «trigger conscious feelings» (p. 2). 
Koch believes that the notion of conscious-
ness as emerging from the brain is wrong (p. 118, 
119). For him, «consciousness is a fundamental, 
an elementary, property of living matter. It can’t 
be derived from anything else, it is a simple 
substance» (p. 119). In this sense, «any and all 
systems of interacting parts possess some measure 
of sentience» and «the larger and more highly 
networked is the system, the greater the degree of 
consciousness» (p. 120). The best current theory 
to provide an accurate account for this is the 
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Giulio 
Tononi. According to Koch, IIT is an elaborate 
version of panpsychism, the hypothesis that all 
matter is sentient to some degree: «Once you 
assume that consciousness is real and onto-
logically distinct from its physical substrate, then 
it is a simple step to conclude that the entire 
cosmos is suffused with sentience» (p. 132).  
In order to better clarify his views on how the 
brain generates conscious experience, Koch di-
scusses a variety of issues related to current 
studies on consciousness (e.g. the difficulty of 
defining this concept and the problem of attri-
buting consciousness to non-human animals or 
machines). In his view, a better scientific under-
standing of how the neural system works, the 
development and use of new methodologies in the 
investigation of the brain, and new infor-mation 
obtained from animal brain research and brain-
damaged patients can help to solve these problems, 
and show at the same time how physical processes 
are related to consciousness.  
In connection with the problem of the 
physical causes of consciousness, the author also 
examines several related topics. One of these is 
the problem of free will, which has been central in 
philosophical and scientific debates for a long 
time. The problem, most generally and normally 
framed, refers to the capacity of rational agents to 
choose a course of action from various alter-
natives. Free will can be related as well with the 
capacity humans have to choose which actions 
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and behaviors are good or bad, right or wrong, 
from a moral point of view and, thus, to be 
considered responsible for their decisions and 
actions. Many authors claim that free will is 
strictly related to consciousness, since con-
sciousness is required for rational deliberation 
and can also be considered the cause of our 
decisions and voluntary actions. However, for 
Koch, the idea that “conscious will” causes 
behavior is simply wrong since it violates natural 
laws: such interaction cannot occur since the 
universe is causally closed (p. 111).  
Unconscious factors (controlled by neurons in 
the brain) play the central role in human 
decisions (pp. 77-78, 83), not rational and free 
deliberations. However, for Koch, human actions 
are also not preordained, because the «complex 
character of brains and deterministic chaos limit 
how accurately even the best-informed scientist 
of the future can predict behavior» (p. 111). This 
leads Koch to adopt a «more pragmatic, 
compatibilist concept of free will», namely living 
«as free of external and internal constrains as 
possible», with the exception of «restrictions 
that I deliberately and consciously impose upon 
myself» – such as ethical concerns (ibidem). 
Unfortunately, he does not explain in more detail 
what this “concept” might be and how exactly it 
might support (if it does) any kind or degree of 
freedom. However, according to the author, 
ultimately an answer to this and other issues 
related to consciousness will only be possible 
through the development of a complete and 
adequate theory of consciousness, which would 
also need to explain how and why consciousness 
arises from the brain.  
As suggested by the title, the book is not a 
systematic academic research report and its main 
concern is not to present a specific scientific 
theory and defend it. As Koch says in the preface, 
it is “not just about science”, but also a 
“confession and a memoir” (p. ix). The book is 
thus a mixture of personal ideas, autobiographical 
experiences, speculative reflections and empirical 
research on consciousness. However, since Koch 
also aims to present some contributions to 
scientific research on consciousness, some brief 
considerations of this content seems appropriate. 
Firstly, the author appears to believe that new 
empirical research, especially on the brain, will 
almost singlehandedly solve many problems which 
have their origin in the history of philosophy (p. 
20, 41), such as the problem of consciousness and 
the problem of free will. According to Koch, the 
right strategy for finding a solution to the 
problem of consciousness and all related issues 
includes ignoring millennia of philosophical de-
bates on these topics (see T. Crane, S. Patterson 
(eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem, Rout-
ledge, London 2000), defining the phenomena in 
play in the most simple and general manner 
possible and focusing uniquely on new empirical 
research. However, he does not offer any real 
argument to justify this idea. In fact, one could 
challenge the view that this strategy will lead to a 
better comprehension of the problems, and argue, 
on the contrary, that excessive simplification of 
such debates may even give rise to more confusion, 
distortion and lack of clarity.  
In fact, complex and controversial notions 
that are highly debated not only in the field of 
philosophy but also in that of psychology, such as 
causation (see A. Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and 
Causality, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2004), 
consciousness, qualia, mind, awareness, sentience, 
experience, feeling, thought, reason, unconscious, 
free will, are used in the book with great inac-
curacy and lack of clarity. More generally, one 
wonders whether ignoring the complexity in some 
of these issues and neglecting tradition of past 
discussions can really help to provide answers, 
because if one cannot define and determine the 
exact nature of the problem, one will hardly be 
able to find out how to solve it. 
Secondly, Koch frequently states that “we 
know” that the brain causes or produces/generates 
consciousness phenomena (p. 23; cf. 16, 29, 42, 43, 
54, 76, 113, 123, 124, 138, 147) and derives a num-
ber of conclusions on the basis of this assumption. 
However, in other parts of his work he instead as-
serts that this is a working hypothesis (p. 34-35) or 
that «we cannot yet pinpoint which regions [or 
neurons] of the brain underlie consciousness» (p. 
54; cf. p. 28, 43, 112, 114). This inconsistency is 
highly problematic since in science it is necessary 
to specify and to justify what degree of certainty we 
ascribe to each hypothesis we rely on, what state-
ments we take for granted, what our working hy-
potheses are and why we consider them to be 
promising.  
However, Koch does not make clear what de-
gree of certainty he attributes to the core-
hypotheses discussed in his book nor does he 
specify whether they should be considered as 
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working hypotheses or as statements to be taken 
for granted. In the latter case, he does not clarify 
what empirical support there might be for the hy-
potheses he presents. Although we have a lot of 
data that show specific correlations between parts 
or processes of the brain and specific mental phe-
nomena, to date we have not observed how exact-
ly the physical brain produces a single belief. 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind these limi-
tations which should lead us to approach this 
work with caution, Koch’s book provides very 
interesting information on brain function and its 
relationship to certain mental processes. For this 
reason, the book may make a significant contri-
bution to debates on these issues. Moreover, the 
fact that he uses relatively non-technical language 
to present scientific research means the book can 
reach a broad audience and possibly promote 
interest in scientific research well beyond 
academic circles. 
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